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Does capital punishment deter capital crimes?  We use panel data covering the fifty states during 
the period 1960-2000 period to examine the issue.  Our study is novel in four ways.  First, we 
estimate the moratorium’s full effect by using both pre- and postmoratorium evidence.  Second, 
we exploit the moratorium as a judicial experiment to measure criminals’ responsiveness to the 
severity of punishment; we compare murder rates immediately before and after changes in states’ 
death penalty laws.  The inference draws on the variations in the timing and duration of the 
moratorium across states to provide a cross section of murder rate changes occurring in various 
time periods.  Third, we supplement the before-and-after comparisons with regression analysis 
that disentangles the impact of the moratorium itself on murder from the effect on murder of 
actual executions.  By using two different approaches, we avoid many of the modeling criticisms 
of earlier studies.  Fourth, in addition to estimating 84 distinct regression models—with 
variations in regressors, estimation method, and functional form—our robustness checks examine 
the moratorium’s impact on crimes that are not punishable by death.  Our results indicate that 
capital punishment has a deterrent effect, and the moratorium and executions deter murders in 
distinct ways.  This evidence is corroborated by both the before-and-after comparisons and 
regression analysis.  We also confirm that the moratorium and executions do not cause similar 
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  The contemporary debate over capital punishment involves a number of important arguments 
based on either moral principles or social welfare considerations.  The primary social welfare issue, 
viewed as “the most important single consideration for both sides in the death penalty controversy,” 
is whether capital punishment deters capital crimes.
1  The death penalty’s deterrent effect is certainly 
an important consideration for several states that are now considering moratoriums on executions.
2   
  Psychologists and criminologists who initially studied the death penalty reported no 
deterrent effect.
3  Economists joined the debate with Ehrlich’s 1975 and 1977 studies.
4  He applied 
regression analysis to both U.S. aggregate data for 1933-1969 and state-level data for 1940 and 
1950 and found a significant deterrent effect.  Ensuing studies use either Ehrlich’s data with 
different regression specifications—different regressors, functional form, or endogenous 
variables—or postmoratorium data with a variant of Ehrlich’s regression model.  Results ranged 
from a substantial deterrent effect to no effect or a small adverse effect.
5
  This study advances the deterrence literature by exploiting an important characteristic that other 
studies overlooked: the experimental nature of the moratorium that the Supreme Court imposed on 
executions during the 1970s.  The moratorium can be viewed as an exogenously imposed “judicial 
experiment.”  The experiment’s effect on murder rates provides evidence about capital punishment’s 
deterrent effect.  As we show, the data indicate that murder rates increased immediately after the 
                                                 
1 Frankin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the American Agenda 167 (1986). 
2 North Carolina, Illinois, and Maryland have suspended executions and moratorium bills have recently been 
introduced in Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Ohio, Delaware, and Nebraska. 
3 For example, J.T. Sellin, J. T., The Death Penalty (1959); H. Eysenck, Crime and Personality (1970). 
4 Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 Am. Econ. Rev., 
397 (1975); Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 
85 J. Pol. Econ. 741 (1977). 
5 A brief description of the deterrence studies appears in the next section. For literature summaries see Samuel 
Cameron, A Review of the Econometric Evidence on the Effects of Capital Punishment, 23 Journal of Socio-
Economics 197 (1994) and K.L. Avio, Measurement Errors and Capital Punishment, 20 Applied Economics 1253 
(1988). 
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for the deterrence hypothesis 
  We compare the murder rate for each state immediately before and after it suspended or 
reinstated the death penalty.  Such comparison provides the basis for a strong inference for several 
reasons.  First, many factors that affect crime—e.g., law enforcement, judicial, demographic, and 
economic variables—change only slightly over a short period of time.  Therefore, quick changes in a 
state’s murder rate following a change in its death penalty law can be attributed to the legal change. 
  Second, the moratorium began and ended in different years in different states.  For example, 
twelve states abolished their death penalty statutes before the 1972 Supreme Court decision.
6  The 
death penalty statutes of Massachusetts and Rhode Island were abolished twice, once in 1972 and a 
second time in 1984.
7  In addition, for the states that rewrote their death penalty statutes during 
1972-1976, the moratorium officially ended with the 1976 Gregg decision.  However, twelve other 
states did not reenact their death penalty statutes until years later, and as late as 1995 (New York, 
see Table 2).  Considering the different start and end dates, the duration of the moratorium varied 
considerably across states, ranging from four to thirty years.  Observing similar changes in murder 
rates immediately after the same legal change in different years and in various states provides 
compelling evidence of the moratorium’s effect on murder. 
  Third, our results gain strength from our examination of the states that suspended and 
reinstated their death penalty statutes several times.  For example, Rhode Island suspended the 
death penalty in 1972, reinstated it in 1977, and abolished it in 1984.  Although many factors that 
                                                 
6 These states include Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (see tables 1 and 2).  Six of these states abolished their statutes during our 
sampling period, contributing to our analysis with a suspension date other than 1972.   
7 Note that Massachusetts reinstated the death penalty in 1982 before it abolished it all together in 1984, and 
Rhode Island reinstated the death penalty in 1977 before it abolished it in 1984.   They are both included in this 
count.  Delaware restored its death penalty statute twice (once in 1961); so it adds a thirteenth observation to the 
sample of non-1976 switches. 
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suspensions: by 13 percent after 1972 and by 25 percent after 1984 in one-year comparisons.  The 
1984 increase even reversed a declining trend in Rhode Island’s murders.  For Rhode Island and 
other states that experience similar murder rate changes after suspensions (or reinstatements) in 
different crime, economic, and demographic environments, the contribution of the legal change to 
murder is paramount.  
  We supplement the before-and-after comparisons with time-series and panel-data regression 
analysis that, unlike many existing studies, uses both pre- and postmoratorium data.  The regressions 
disentangle the impact of the moratorium itself on murder from the effect of actual executions on 
murder.  Basing our inference on two different approaches allows us to de-emphasize the difficult 
modeling issues that have impeded earlier regression studies. 
  We also apply a battery of tests to examine the robustness of our findings.  These include 
regression sensitivity checks with 77 additional regression equations that differ in regressors, 
functional form, data, and estimation method.  In addition, we confirm that the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment is not driven, spuriously, by common crime patterns.  We test whether the 
moratorium has an effect on property crimes that are not punishable by death.  If the relationship 
between the moratorium and these crimes is similar to the relationship between the moratorium and 
murder, then we should suspect that murder-rate changes are the result of broader trends in criminal 
behavior affecting all crimes.  However, our results indicate that the moratorium and executions deter 
murder, but not property crime. 
  The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the recent history of the death penalty 
in the United States and reviews the literature on the deterrent effect of capital punishment.  
Section III reports results for the U.S. during the 1960-2000 period using national data.  The 
  3
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in the death penalty laws.  Section IV discusses the results of before-and after comparisons and 
regressions using state-level panel data.  Section V demonstrates the robustness of our findings and 
provides evidence that our results are not driven by broader criminality and enforcement factors.  
Section VI concludes the paper.   
 
II.  Capital Punishment and Deterrence 
  In this section we briefly discuss the recent history of the death penalty in the United States 
and review the literature on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 
 
A. History of the Death Penalty 
During the first half of the twentieth century, executions were both frequent and popular.  More 
executions occurred during the 1930s than in any other decade in American history: an average of 
167 executions each year.  Although the use of capital punishment declined somewhat in the 1940s 
and 1950s, executions were still much more frequent than today: approximately 130 a year in the 
1940s and 75 a year during the 1950s, compared to an average of 48 per year in the 1990s.  Over 65 
percent of the American public approved of the death penalty during these decades.
8   
  In the late 1950s, however, public support for the death penalty started to decline, reaching a 
low of 42 percent in 1966.
9   Opposition to the death penalty increased because of growing doubts 
about the morality of the death penalty, awareness of western Europe’s abandonment of capital 
punishment, abatement of the 1930s’ crime wave, lack of deterrence evidence, widespread belief in 
the racially discriminatory use of the death penalty, and increasing concern about the arbitrariness 
                                                 
8 Raymond Paternoster, Capital Punishment in America 20 (1991). 
9 Paternoster, supra note 8 at 19. 
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10  Reflecting the public’s growing disapproval, executions declined 
steadily throughout the 1960. 
  By the 1960s, all executing states had changed their mandatory capital statutes, borrowed 
originally from English common law, to discretionary statutes.  Under the new statutes, juries had 
complete control over whether a defendant received a death sentence.  This sentencing freedom 
introduced arbitrariness into death penalty application.  As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court began 
hearing cases involving the discretionary capital statutes in the late 1960s.  While the constitutionality 
of capital punishment was being challenged, no states were willing to put people to death. 
  The Supreme Court finally resolved the constitutionality of discretionary capital statutes in 
three cases in 1972: Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v. Texas, collectively 
referred to as the Furman decision (408 U.S. 238).  In a 5-4 decision, the justices held that 
discretionary capital statutes resulted in arbitrary sentencing, violating the 8
th Amendment’s cruel 
and unusual punishment clause.  This decision effectively voided the death penalty statutes of all 
executing states and commuted the sentences of over 600 death row inmates. 
 After  Furman, the states quickly began to draft new death penalty laws.  Some states passed 
mandatory statutes that the Supreme Court soon found unconstitutional, while others enacted 
guided discretion statutes that provide guidelines for juries in death penalty cases.  The Supreme 
Court approved these statutes in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153), Jurek v. Texas (428 U.S. 
262), and Proffitt v. Florida (428 U.S. 242), known collectively as the Gregg decision.  During the 
next twenty years many states enacted new constitutional death penalty statutes.  After the 
enactment of these new statutes, death rows quickly filled up.  Since 1977, there have been 856 
                                                 
10 Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 25 (1982). 
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from an all-time high of 80 percent in 1994.
11
  Despite the recent resurgence in executions, the use of the death penalty varies widely across-
states.  As Table 1 shows, 12 states do not have capital punishment laws: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin.  Most of these states have not executed anyone since the early 1900s, and  
Wisconsin, Michigan and Maine legally abolished the death penalty as early as the 1800s. 
  Of the 38 states that currently have capital punishment laws, six have performed no 
postmoratorium executions: Connecticut, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and 
South Dakota.  As Table 2 shows, several of these states abolished their death penalty laws years 
before the 1972 Furman decision.  Other states were prompt to reenact their capital statutes after 
Furman and began postmoratorium executions as soon as the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
However, some of the states have performed only one or two postmoratorium executions. 
 
B. Literature on the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty 
  In the U.S., the deterrence issue has been a topic of acrimonious debate for decades.  The 
initial participants in the debate were psychologists and criminologists.  Their research was either 
theoretical or based on comparisons of crime patterns for matched regions with different rates of 
execution.  The studies generally found no deterrent effect.
12
  The debate in the economics literature began with Ehrlich’s seminal work that first used 
regression analysis to study the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
13   His finding of a strong 
deterrent effect contrasted sharply with the earlier findings.  Since then, although many researchers 
have used Ehrlich’s data and sample period, they have reached divergent conclusions by using 
                                                 
11 Jeffrey M. Jones, Gallop Poll Analysis, Gallop News Service, May 19, 2003. 
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Cloninger, Ehrlich and Gibbons, Ehrlich and Liu, and Liu have found a deterrent effect of capital 
punishment.
14  In contrast, Bowers and Pierce, Passel and Taylor, and Hoenack and Weiler find no 
deterrence when they use the same data with alternative specifications.
15  Similarly, McAleer and 
Veall, Leamer, and McManus, find no deterrent effect when different variables are included over 
the same sample period.
16  Finally, Black and Orsagh find mixed results depending on the cross-
section year they use.
17
  Others have updated Ehrlich’s time-series data or used more recent cross-section data.  These 
studies also produce different results by using similar data with different econometric 
specifications.  Layson and Cover and Thistle, for example, use identical extensions of Ehrlich’s 
time-series data: 1933-1977.
18  Although Layson finds a significant deterrent effect of executions, 
Cover and Thistle correct for data nonstationarity and find no support for the deterrent effect.  
Chressanthis employs time-series data covering 1966 through 1985 and Brumm and Cloninger use 
                                                                                                                                                           
12 Sellin, supra note 3; Eysenck, supra note 3; and for a general discussion, see Cameron, supra note 5. 
13 Ehrlich (1975), supra note 4; Ehrlich (1977), supra note 4. 
14 James A. Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide?  Some Time Series Evidence, 5 Journal of 
Behavioral Economics 45 (1976); Dale O. Cloninger, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Cross-Sectional 
Analysis, 6 Journal of Behavioral Economics 87 (1977); Isaac Ehrlich & Joel Gibbons, On the Measurement of the 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 Journal of Legal Studies 35 (1977); Isaac 
Ehrlich & Zhiqiang Liu, Sensitivity Analysis of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Lets Keep the Econ in Econometrics, 
42 Journal of Law and Economics 455 (1999); Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and the Deterrence Hypothesis: 
Some New Insights and Empirical Evidence, Eastern Economic J. (forthcoming). 
15 W. J. Bowers & J.L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s work on Capital Punishment, 85 Yale 
Law Journal 187 (1975); Peter Passell & John B. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another 
View, 67 American Economic Review 445 (1977); Stephen A. Hoenack & William C. Weiler, A Structural Model 
of Murder Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, 70 American Economic Review 327 (1980). 
16 Michael McAleer & Michael R. Veall, How Fragile are Fragile Inferences? A Re-Evaluation of the Deterrent 
Effect of Capital Punishment, 71 Review of Economics and Statistics 99 (1989); Edward E. Leamer, Let’s Take 
the Con out of Econometrics, 73 American Economic Review 31 (1983); Walter S. McManus, Estimates of the 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: The Importance of the Researcher’s Prior Beliefs, 93 Journal of Political 
Economy 417 (1985). 
17 T. Black & T. Orsagh, New Evidence on the Efficacy of Sanctions as a Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Social 
Science Quarterly 616 (1978). 
18 Stephen A. Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-Series Evidence, 52 
Southern Economic Journal 68 (1985); James P. Cover & Paul D. Thistle, Time Series, Homicide, and the 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 54 Southern Economic Journal 615 (1988). 
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19  In contrast, 
Grogger uses daily data for California during 1960-1963 and finds no significant deterrent effect.
20
  Recent studies have used panel data instead of time-series or cross-section data, but examine 
only the postmoratorium evidence.  Again, similar data with different techniques produce disparate 
results.  Using state-level panel data, Lott and Landes, Cloninger and Marchesini, Mocan and 
Gittings, Zimmerman, Zimmerman, and Shepherd find a deterrent effect of capital punishment.  
However, Albert finds no deterrent effect with state data.
21  Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd also 
find a deterrent effect using county-level panel data.
22    
  Most recent studies use postmoratorium data and earlier studies used premoratorium data; no 
study has used data from both periods.  Moreover, all of these studies have based their analyses on 
regressions, applying slight variations in specification to similar datasets.  No study has used the 
1970s death penalty moratorium in the context of a controlled-group experiment.   
 
III.  Analysis of National Data 
  We begin our empirical analysis by examining the aggregate crime and execution data for the 
                                                 
19 George A. Chressanthis, Capital Punishment and the Deterrent Effect Revisited: Recent Time-Series 
Econometric Evidence, 18 Journal of Behavioral Economics 81 (1989); Harold J. Brumm and Dale O. Cloninger, 
Perceived Risk of Punishment and the Commission of Homicides: A Covariance Structure Analysis, 31 Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 1 (1996). 
20 Jeffrey Grogger, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Daily Homicide Counts, 85 J. of 
the American Statistical Association 295 (1990). 
21 John R. Lott, Jr. & William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shootings, Bombings, and Right-to-Carry 
Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement, (John M. Olin Law & Economics 
Working paper No. 73, University of Chicago Law School, 2000); Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, 
Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 35 Applied Economics 569 (2001); H. Naci 
Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment, Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming); Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect 
of Alternative Execution Methods in the United States: 1978-2000, Federal Communications Commission 
Working Paper (2003); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, Federal 
Communications Commission Working Paper (2003), Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution 
Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital Punishment, Clemson University Working Paper (2003); Craig J. Albert, 
Challenging Deterrence: New Insights on Capital Punishment Derived from Panel Data, 60 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 321 (1999). 
22 Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul Rubin, and Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? 
New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, American Law and Economics Review (forthcoming). 
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present before-and-after moratorium comparisons of murder rates and regression results. The data 
and sources are described in the Data Appendix.  The analysis of national data motivates the more 
involved state-level analysis that follows.   
 
A.  General Trends 
  Figure 1 displays the murder rate and the number of executions in the United States for the 
period 1960-2000.
23  The two series appear to move in opposite directions.  Executions declined 
precipitously during the 1960s, dropped to zero for most of the 1970s, and increased with some 
fluctuations during the 1980s and 1990s.  The increase is particularly steep during the 1990s.  The 
murder rate, on the other hand, reversed its downward trend of the early 1960s and increased 
rapidly throughout the early 1970s, with some fluctuations in the late 1970s.  The murder rate more 
than doubled from its 1963 low to its late 1970s high.  The rate has declined since then, initially 
with brief fluctuations and later steadily, returning to its lows of the early 1960s. 
  We can identify three distinct periods in Figure 1:  (1) the early 1960s with high (but falling) 
executions and falling murder rates, (2) 1964 to the mid- to late-1970s with very few executions 
and rapidly rising murder rates, and (3) 1990 to 2000 with soaring executions and sharply declining 
murder rate.   The pattern during the remaining period (1980-1989) is not as clear or persistent, 
although the two series still have opposite trends. 
 
B.  Before-and-After Comparisons 
  The death penalty moratorium that the Supreme Court imposed between 1972 and 1976 
provides a “judicial experiment” for analyzing deterrence.  The likelihood that a murder committed 
during this period would be punished by execution was zero throughout the country.  This was not 
  9
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressthe case before 1972 or after 1976.  Thus, a comparison of murder rates immediately before and after 
1972 can shed some light on how imposing a moratorium on the death penalty affects murders.  
Similarly, a comparison of murder rates immediately before and after 1976 can provide evidence on 
the effect of lifting the moratorium on murder.  Before-and-after comparisons over short horizons 
provide evidence that is as close to ceteris paribus as possible absent a full econometric model.   
  We make these comparisons using one-year, two-year, and three-year windows.  For 
example, for the one-year window, we compare murder rates for 1971 and 1973 and murder rates 
for 1975 and 1977.
24  For the two-year window the average murder rate for 1970 and 1971 is 
compared with the average murder rate for 1973 and 1974, and the average murder rate for 1974 
and 1975 is compared with the average murder rate for 1977 and 1978.  Three-year comparisons 
are similarly made using three-year averages. 
  The results indicate that the annual murder rate jumped by .8 or 9.3% when the moratorium 
was imposed and dropped by .8 or 8.3% when the moratorium was lifted.  The two-year average 
murder rate also jumped by 1.35 or 16.3% when the moratorium was imposed and dropped by .8 or 
8.2% when the moratorium was lifted.  The larger effect for the two-year comparisons is caused by 
rising murder rates during the moratorium years.  Three-year averages show a similar pattern with 
an increase of 1.66 or 20.9% and a drop of .4 or 4.1% for the respective effects.   
 
C.  Regression Results 
  We also examine the movements of murders and executions over various periods using 
regressions with and without control variables.  Table 3 reports the results from the simple 
regressions with no control variables.  We run a regression for each deterrent variable—executions, 
lagged executions, and a moratorium dummy variable—on the murder rate over our entire sample 
                                                                                                                                                           
23 Following the common practice, the murder rate used in our analysis is the number of murders and nonnegligent 
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for two sub-periods 1960-1976 (before and during the moratorium) and 1977-2000 (postmoratorium). 
  The estimated coefficients of execution and its one-period lag are negative and highly 
significant for all three time horizons, indicating that murders and executions move in opposite 
directions.
25 The lagged results suggest that the effect of executions on murder may spread over 
time.  The lag effect reflects the timing of executions within a year (January vs. December, for 
instance) and the possibility that a community’s memory of an execution may linger.  The larger t-
statistics for the postmoratorium estimates may reflect the strong opposite trends that murders and 
executions exhibit during the 1990s.
26  In our state-level analysis, we explore factors that might 
contribute to differences in the magnitude of the relationship between murders and executions. 
  The relationship between murders and executions is not symmetrical.  A regression of the 
number of executions on the murder rate produces a significant coefficient estimate, but 
regressions of the number of executions on both the murder rate lagged one year and the murder 
rate lagged two years produce insignificant estimates, suggesting that any causal link is more likely 
to run from executions to murders.   
  The regression of the murder rate on the moratorium binary variable reflect the fact that 
murder rates were higher during the moratorium years.  The moratorium binary variable, which 
takes a value of one for every year during the moratorium period and zero otherwise, is intended to 
extract the gross effect of the moratorium on the probability distribution of the U.S. murder rate.  
                                                                                                                                                           
manslaughters per 100,000 population.
24 The year of the change (1972 or 1976) is discarded since it covers two regimes. 
25 It is interesting to note that these results are robust to the choice of functional form, as neither taking the log nor 
differencing the variables alters the significance of the coefficient estimates.  Moreover, the observed negative 
relationship also holds between the murder rate and higher lags of executions. 
26 We also repeated the two-equation estimation for two other sub-periods: the 1980s and 1990-2000.  Unreported 
results confirm that the negative relationship is significant during both decades, but much stronger during the 
1990s; e.g., p-values for the coefficient estimates are (.003 and .004) and (.000 and .000) for the 1980s and 1990-
  11
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mean of the distribution of the murder rate increased by 1.708 during the moratorium period.  
Comparing this estimate with the estimate of the constant term (7.591), which is the mean of the 
murder rate over the remaining period, we observe a 22.5% increase in the mean murder rate 
during the moratorium years. 
  We repeat the previous regressions adding several control variables as regressors; these 
include the unemployment rate, per capita real income, and real expenditures on police protection.  
The first two variables control for economic conditions that may influence the cost of committing 
crime.  The third variable serves as a deterrent variable; additional expenditures on police 
protection may increase the likelihood of apprehension, which should deter crime. 
  Table 4 presents the regression estimates.  The signs and significance of the death penalty 
variables are strikingly similar to those reported for the exploratory regressions in Table 3.  The 
execution variable and its lag have negative and highly significant coefficients in all equations, 
indicating that more executions are associated with fewer murders.  The coefficient of the binary 
variable that identifies the moratorium years is positive and significant, indicating that even after 
we control for other relevant variables, the moratorium still leads to an increase in murders. 
  The unemployment rate is positive and highly significant in all equations, suggesting that 
more unemployment may lead to a higher murder rate, as expected from economic theory.  The 
effects of income and police expenditure on murders turn out to be insignificant in all but one 
equation.  Donohue and Levitt also report that unemployment has a positive effect and income has 
an insignificant effect on murders and other crimes.
 27
                                                                                                                                                           
2000, respectively.  While the strength of the relationship seems to change over time, its direction and significance 
does not. 
27 John J. Donohue and Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 379 (2001). 
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  National data masks cross-state variations in murder rates and the frequency of executions.  
Because capital statutes are passed by state legislatures and executions are usually carried out by 
states, the deterrent effect of an execution may be confined to the executing state.
28  We examine 
state-level evidence to make a more powerful inference about the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment.  State-level analysis exploits cross-state dispersions in the timing and duration of the 
moratorium to isolate its effect on murders, therefore, reducing the possibility of spurious (or 
incidental) results. 
  In the following sections, we first compare states murder rates before and after the 
moratorium.  Then, we report the regression results from state-level panel data.  We use data 
covering all fifty states and the District of Columbia for the period 1960 through 2000.  The data 
and sources are described in the Data Appendix.   
 
A.  Before-and-After Comparisons 
  In this section, we analyze the effect of both suspending and reinstating the death penalty on 
state murder rates.  We compare the murder rates for the years immediately before and after the 
legal change.
29  We similarly compare two-year (three-year) murder rate averages for the two years 
(three years) preceding the switch and the two years (three years) following the switch.  The 
resulting murder rate changes, referred to as one-year, two-year, and three-year changes, provide 
the basis for the analysis in this section. 
  We first examine the effect of suspending (or abolishing) the death penalty on murders.  Figure 
2 presents kernel density estimates of the cross-state distributions of the change in murder rates 
                                                 
28 Executions carried out by the federal government are quite rare; only one occurred in 1963 during our sample. 
29 The year of the change is discarded since it covers two regimes. 
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30  The three charts correspond to the 
three comparison windows of one, two, and three years.  Positive values indicate an increase in the 
murder rate.  The concentration of the distributions in the positive range in Figure 2 is striking.  In 
fact, all three measures suggest that suspending the death penalty is very likely to be followed by an 
increase in murders.  This is more pronounced for the three-year change, perhaps reflection that as 
time passes, more criminals respond to a change in the punishment level. 
  The descriptive statistics characterizing the three probability distributions are reported in Table 
5.
31  Each column contains statistics pertaining to a comparison window.  The number of 
observations is slightly larger than the number of states with switches, because a few states had more 
than one switch, generating more than one observation.
32  A considerable number of observations are 
positive indicating that many states experience an increase in the murder rate after they suspend (or 
abolish) the death penalty.  This is as large as 41 observations or 91 percent of all cases (for three-
year comparisons).  The remaining observations are not all negative; there is no change in the 
murder rate in one two-year comparison, one three-year comparison, and two one-year comparisons. 
  Moreover, both the sample median and mean are positive, suggesting an overall increase in 
murder following the suspension of the death penalty.  The sample standard errors are relatively 
                                                 
30 Kernel density estimates have the advantage of being smooth and also independent of the choice of origin—
unlike histograms that are not independent of the location of the bins. We estimate densities using Biweight Kernel 
with optimal bandwidth.  Biweight Kernel provides density estimates that track the underlying histogram more 
closely than other kernels such as Epanecknikov or Gaussian, and yet it has a high efficiency (99%).  Bernard 
Silverman, Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis (1994).  Also, using optimal bandwidth diminishes 
the arbitrariness inherent in choosing bandwidth—which is similar to choosing the number of bins in a histogram  
31  To avoid undue outlier influence on the statistics reported in Table 5 and the distribution estimates in Figure 2, 
we dropped Vermont’s observations of murder rate increases of 200 percent, 360 percent, and 458 percent (for 
one-year, two-year, and three-year comparisons) following the ban on executions.  We also dropped the one-year 
change for South Dakota that shows a 216 percent increase in murder.  These four observations would have added 
to the strength of the deterrence evidence provided here, but we feel more comfortable excluding them given the 
small size of these states and their small murder rates.  All other observations used in Tables 5 and 6 are not large 
enough to cause any concern.   
32 Note that the analysis, obviously, does not include several non-switching states—states that abolished the death 
penalty prior to 1960 (the start of our sample) and never reinstated it.  These states are included, however, in our 
regression analysis of the next section. 
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Overall, these statistics and the distribution estimates in Figure 2 suggest that states that suspend or 
abolish their capital punishment statutes experience a significant increase in their murders. 
  Next, we examine the effect of reinstating the death penalty on murders.  Figure 3 presents 
the cross-state distributions (probability density functions) of changes in the murder rate 
immediately after reinstating the death penalty.  Each chart contains the kernel density estimate for 
one of the three comparison measures.  In contrast to Figure 2, the distributions are more 
concentrated in the negative range, suggesting that there are more cases where the murder rate 
declines after the death penalty is reinstated.  Although the negative range concentration in these 
charts is not as strong as the positive range concentration of the charts in Figure 2, the deterrent 
effect of reinstating the death penalty is obvious. 
  Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics for these distributions; it has the same format as Table 
5.
33  The number of negative observations in Table 6 indicates that, in about 70 percent of the cases, 
murder drops after the state reinstates the death penalty.  Moreover, both the sample median and 
mean are negative, suggesting an overall drop in murders following a re-adoption of the death 
penalty.  The t-statistics are also negative and significant for all three measures. 
 Overall,  these  statistics and the distribution estimates in Figure 3 suggest that states reinstating 
their death penalty experience a drop in murder rates.  The drop, however, does not seem to be as 
widespread as the increase in the number of murders resulting from suspending the death penalty.  
There are several plausible explanations for the seemingly asymmetric strength of the deterrent 
                                                 
33 There are fewer observations in Table 6 than in Table 5 because some states that abolished capital punishment 
never reinstated it during our sampling period.  Also, the number of observations in Table 6 is not the same across 
the three horizons: 41 observations in the one-year comparisons and 39 observations in the two- and three-year 
comparisons.  Massachusetts’s switch to the death penalty following the moratorium that lasted only one full 
calendar year (1983) only contributes to the one-year comparisons.  Similarly, Delaware’s reinstatement of the 
death penalty in 1961 is too close to the beginning of our sample to be measured by the two-year and three-year 
comparisons. 
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sentences of many death row inmates.  The combined effect was perhaps more potent than its 
reversal that involved only a change in the death penalty statutes.  Second, the ban on executions 
that took place simultaneously across the country was more dramatic, and caught more public 
attention, than the switch back to the death penalty that occurred at a staggered pace over two 
decades.   Finally, suspending the death penalty necessarily stops executions, but reinstating the 
death penalty does not guarantee new executions.  A glance at Table 2 reveals that many states that 
reinstated the death penalty years ago have yet to execute a convict.  The regression analysis of the 
next section, which uses the number of executions as well as the moratorium as explanatory 
variables, sheds more light on this finding.  
 
B.  Regression Analysis and Results 
  In this section, we use a panel of fifty states and the District of Columbia over the 1960-2000 
period.  Our data include economic, demographic, crime, punishment, legal, and law enforcement 
variables.  Panel data allow us to make a strong deterrent inference by exploiting cross-states 
differences, and particularly, the staggered timing of the moratorium across states.  We use fixed-
effects estimation to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states and avoid the bias caused 
by the correlation between state-specific effects and other control variables.
34  
  We also control for possible heteroskedasticity and nonnormality of regression errors that result 
from variation in the size of states.  Since the dependent variable and most control variables are in per 
capita rates, we use state population as the weight in our generalized least squares estimation.  In 
addition, we use robust standard errors to correct for any residual heteroskedasticity of unknown form 
or nonnormal error distributions.  These corrections yield consistent estimates of the variance of 
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possible clustering effects—dependence within clusters (groups).  The correction leads to a more 
efficient estimation with little loss in accuracy if the clustering effect is absent. 
  Our baseline regression model consists of a single equation with the murder rate as the 
dependent variable and various regressors as control variables.
35  We use the economic model of 
crime and the death penalty literature to specify these regressors.
36  They include three deterrent 
variables: the number of executions in the states, the number of executions lagged by one year to 
allow for adjustment in criminals’ behavior, and a binary variable that equals one for every year 
during a state’s moratorium and zero otherwise.  The economic variables include real per capita 
personal income and the unemployment rate.  The demographic variables are the percentages of 
population age 15 to 19, age 20 to 24, and belonging to a minority group.  Age and race variables 
are included because of the differential treatment of youth by the justice system, variation in the 
opportunity cost of time through the life cycle, and racially-based differences in opportunities.  We 
also include full-time state police employees as a non-punishment deterrent factor; enhanced police 
presence may increase detection and apprehension, deterring some criminal activities.
37  Other 
                                                                                                                                                           
34 Another advantage of the dataset is its resilience to common panel problems such as self-selectivity, 
nonresponse, attrition, or sampling design shortfalls. 
35 In this section, we only report the main results.  The robustness of findings to estimation and specification 
choices is examined in the next section.   
36 We do not include death sentences (or convictions) as a control for two reasons.  First, data for this variable is 
not available during one-third of our sample period; including this variable would lead to excluding many years of 
data.  Second, this variable is not expected to have a significant effect on murders due to the “weakness” or 
“porosity” of the state’s criminal justice system and reversibility of the death sentences.  For example, if criminals 
know that the justice system issues many death sentences but that the executions are not carried out, then they may 
not be deterred by an increase in the likelihood of a death sentence.  In fact, Leibman, Fagan and West report that 
nearly 70 percent of all death sentences issued between 1973 and 1995 were reversed on appeal at the state or 
federal level.  Liebman, J.S., J. Fagan, & V. West, Capital attrition: Error rates in capital cases, 1973-1995, 78 
Texas Law Review 1839 (2000).  Also, six states sentence offenders to death, but have performed no executions, 
reflecting the indeterminacy of a death sentence and its ineffectiveness in deterring murders.  Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, 
and Shepherd examine the effect of death sentences on murder and find support for this argument.  Dezhbakhsh, 
Rubin, and Shepherd, supra note 22. 
37 Ideally, we could also use the arrest rate as a deterrent variable; unfortunately, state-level arrest data is not 
available for many years of our sampling period. 
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and time-specific binary variables that capture long-term national trends in crime.
38
  The seven primary models reported in Table 7 differ in terms of their deterrent variables: 
executions, lagged executions, and the state moratorium binary variable.  The first three models 
include only one deterrent variable, models 4, 5, and 6 include some combination of two deterrent 
variables, and model three includes all three deterrent variables. 
  In all models, the estimated coefficients of the deterrent variables are highly significant.  
Executions and lagged executions have negative coefficients, indicating that executions reduce 
murders.  The state moratorium variable has a positive coefficient, suggesting that banning executions 
increases the murder rate, or alternatively, reinstating the death penalty reduces the murder rate.  These 
estimates suggest that both adopting a capital statute and exercising it have strong deterrent effects. 
  Moreover, the significant execution and moratorium coefficients in the equations that include 
both variables (models 5, 6, and 7) suggest that the deterrent effect of executions is quite distinct 
from the deterrent effect of a death penalty statute.  The frequency of executions increases the 
magnitude of the deterrent effect in states have death penalty laws.  Similarly, the deterrent effect is 
weaker for states that have the death penalty but do not exercise it.  An implication of this finding 
is that reinstating the death penalty has a weaker effect on criminal behavior than suspending it, 
because the latter stops executions but the former does not necessarily start them.  This result 
provides justification for the asymmetric effect of suspending versus reinstating the death penalty 
seen in the before-and-after comparisons of the previous section.   
  The effects of the other variables on murder are also consistent across models.  Murder is 
negatively related to both per capita real income and the unemployment rate, as indicated by the 
significant negative coefficients for these variables.  The effect of income is consistent with 
                                                 
38 Estimates of over fifty coefficients corresponding to these variables are not reported for space economy. 
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decrease.  Several studies have found a similar relationship between income and crime.
39  In 
contrast, the negative relationship between murder and unemployment is not intuitive.  
Nevertheless, this result accords with existing empirical evidence.
40  In general, unemployment is 
more likely to affect property crimes than murder. 
  The demographic variables all have the expected relationships with murder rates.  The 
minority variable has significantly positive coefficients in all models, suggesting a positive 
relationship with murder.  Many minority groups have fewer legitimate earning opportunities, and 
thus a lower opportunity cost of criminal activities relative to their white counterparts.  The 
variable for the percentage of the population age 20-24 has a significantly positive coefficient.  The 
percentage of the population that is 15-19, on the other hand, has a negative and significant 
relationship with murder.  The contrasting signs on the age variables are consistent with existing 
research that finds that most violent crimes are committed by offenders in their early twenties.
 41  
Other studies have found similar relationships between these demographic variables and murder.
42
  Only police employment has no significant relationship with murder.
43  Although one might 
expect that more police would improve arrest rates and lower crime, existing empirical evidence 
does not support this theory.  Instead, other studies find that police employment can be either 
positively or negatively related to crime rates, depending on the racial and gender makeup of the 
                                                 
39 Eric D. Gould, David B. Mustard, & Bruce A. Weinberg, Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in 
the United States: 1979-1997, 84 Rev. Econ. &  Stat. (forthcoming 2003). Shepherd, supra note 21. 
40 Mocan & Gittings, supra note 21; Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt, & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison Conditions, 
Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, (manuscript, 2001); Christopher Ruhm, Are Recessions Good for Your 
Health?, 115 Quarterly Journal of Economics 617 (2000). 
41 Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 139 (1996). 
42 Ehrlich (1977), supra note 4; Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of 
California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. Legal Stud. 159 (2002). 
43  Dezhbakhsh and Rubin find a negative relationship between police payroll and crimes, but such data is not 
available for our sampling period.  Hashem Dezhbakhsh and Paul H. Rubin, Lives Saved or Lives Lost?  The 
Effect of Concealed-Handgun Laws on Crime, 88 American Economic Review 468 (1998). 
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44  Thus, it is not surprising that our measure of total police employment, aggregated 
across gender and race, has no consistent relationship with murder. 
  Our results do not necessarily imply that all murders are deterrable; for example, crimes 
committed by the mentally ill may not deterrable.
45  The inclusion of nondeterrable murders in the 
murder rate might dilute the measurement, reducing the significance of the estimated coefficients.  
The fact that our regressions still produce highly significant coefficient estimates suggests that 
many kinds of murders are deterrable. 
 
V.  Robustness Checks 
  We demonstrate the robustness of our results to further strengthen the deterrence inference.  
We first examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in regressors, functional form, data, and 
estimation method.  Then, we confirm that the deterrent effect of capital punishment is not a 
spurious finding stemming from common crime patterns. 
 
A.  Regression Specification 
  To check the robustness of our regression results, we conduct a battery of tests involving 77 
additional regression equations.  Estimates are not reported for brevity, but are available upon 
request.  A discussion of the findings follows. 
  We first change the regressors in the seven primary models reported in Table 7.  Five 
variations are considered leading to 35 models.  The variations include dropping all regressors that 
are not deterrent variables, dropping the long-term trend variables, adding a measure of states’ 
partisan tendencies, replacing the minority variable with detailed measures of racial distribution, 
and adding other age variables. 
                                                 
44 Donohue & Levitt supra note 27; John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others at Risk?: Affirmative 
Action, Police Departments, and Crime, 38 Economic Inquiry 239 (2000). 
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the regressions that include only the deterrent variables are all significant—one at the five-percent 
level and the rest at the one-percent level— and identical in sign to the primary models.  Dropping 
the time trend from the set of regressors, also, does not alter our results.  The deterrent variables in 
all seven models have the same sign as before and are significant at the one-percent level.  The 
control variables maintain their significance and signs in these regressions as well. 
  In addition, adding a measure of the states’ partisan influences does not affect our results.  
We define partisan influence as the percentage of the statewide vote received by the Republican 
presidential candidate in the most recent election.  This variable measures political pressure to “get 
tough on crime” through the appointment of new judges and prosecutors or other changes to the 
makeup of the justice system.
46  The variable is insignificant in all seven models, and its inclusion 
does not affect the signs or significance of the deterrent, demographic, and economic variables.  
  We next replace the minority variable with its breakdown into percent African American, 
percent Asian, native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander, percent Native American or Native Alaskan, 
and percent other minorities (mostly Hispanics).  The deterrent variables continue to be significant 
at the one-percent level with signs identical to the primary models.  The economic and age 
variables are also unaffected.  Among the minority measures, the African American variable and 
the other minorities variable are significant and positive in all equations, suggesting a higher 
murder rate in areas with high concentrations of African Americans and Hispanics.  The pattern of 
coefficient estimates for the other minority groups is not as consistent, although the coefficients of 
the Asian American variable tend to be negative in most equations. 
  Finally, we add two new age variables: percentages of population age 10-14 and age 25-29.  
                                                                                                                                                           
45 For a study of which crimes are deterrable see Shepherd, supra note 21. 
46 “Get tough on crime” is a popular message with many Republican candidates. 
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Table 7.  Other variables in the models also show little change.  The 10-14 year-old population has 
a negative and significant effect on murders, but the 25-29 year-old population does not seem to 
have a significant effect on murders. 
  Next, we examine the robustness of our results to the functional specification by dropping the 
linearity assumption.  We estimate the seven models in Table 7 using a log-linear model.  All of the 
deterrent variables continue to have the same sign as those in Table 7 and the estimates are all 
significant at the one-percent level.
47  The demographic and economic variables also have the same 
signs and similar statistical significance.  These striking results suggest that the deterrence finding 
is not sensitive to the functional form of the regression equations. 
  Police employment data were not reported for many states during the 1960-1964 period and 
are unavailable for Hawaii and the District of Columbia during our entire sampling period.  
Because police employment changes gradually and along a trend line, we extrapolated the 1960-
1964 observations for the states that did not report them.
48  To examine the robustness of our 
findings to the inclusion of these extrapolated data, we also estimate all seven regression models 
without police employment and with unextrapolated police employment.  In all 14 models, the 
deterrent and control variables have the same signs and similar statistical significance.   
  Furthermore, to examine the sensitivity of our results to our estimation method, we reestimate 
all seven models from Table 7 with different estimation choices:  (i) without population weights, 
(ii) without controlling for the clustering effect, and (iii) without robust standard errors.  Although 
one may expect that all three estimations will result in different standard errors and that the 
                                                 
47 For observations with no executions, we changed the execution count from 0  to .01 to prevent undefined values 
when the log was taken.  
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of the 21 models are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 7.
 49   Most coefficient 
estimates, and especially the deterrent estimates, maintain their signs and statistical significance. 
Thus, changing the estimation method does not detract from the strength of the deterrent finding. 
  Figure 4 presents a summary of these robustness checks.  Each of the three charts shows the 
frequency distributions of the estimated coefficient of one of the deterrent variables from the 84 
regression models (7 primary models and 77 robustness checks).
50  The distribution of the 
coefficient estimates for execution and lagged execution are entirely concentrated in the negative 
range, implying that more executions lead to fewer murders.  These two distributions are bimodal, 
because models that include both variables yield smaller coefficient estimates than models that 
include only one.  The distribution of the coefficient estimates for the moratorium variable is 
entirely concentrated in the positive range, implying that moratoriums increase murders.  The few 
near-zero outliers arise from the scaling effect in the log-linear equations that combine regressors 
that are in log form with the binary moratorium variable.  The concentration of distributions in all 
three cases suggests that the estimated models are not misspecified.   
  The robustness checks confirm that our results are not driven by the choices of control 
variables, functional form, data, and estimation method.  The consistency of the signs and 
significance of the deterrent variables across the 84 regression models strongly suggests that our 
deterrence finding is not an econometric artifact.  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
48 We dropped Hawaii and the District of Columbia from our regression analysis, because they report no police 
employment data for our time period.  Hawaii never had a capital statute during our sampling period and the 
District of Columbia abolished the death penalty in 1972. 
49 Controlling for the clustering effect and using robust standard errors adjusts the variance-covariance matrix of 
the estimated coefficients but not the estimated coefficients.  
50 These distributions do not include estimates obtained by dropping the clustering or robustness corrections, since 
these corrections change the standard errors but not the coefficient estimates.  Their inclusion would have resulted 
in repetition and double counting.  Biweight kernel density estimation with optimal bandwidth is used to smooth 
out the frequency distributions. 
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  Is the observed pattern in the murder rate driven by the death penalty statute and frequency of 
executions or by broader criminality and enforcement factors that affect all kinds of crimes?  To 
answer this question, we test whether the death penalty has an effect on other crimes that are not 
punishable by death.  Similarity of the relationship between the moratorium and these crimes with 
the relationship between the moratorium and murder would suggest that murder-rate changes are 
perhaps the result of broader trends in criminal behavior affecting all crimes. 
  For this robustness check, we estimate the relationship between capital punishment and 
property crimes.  We choose property crime, rather than non-murder violent crimes, for this 
robustness check because violent crimes may be affected by the severity of punishment for murder 
as they often result in unintended murders.  An armed robber may shoot a policeman to escape, or a 
rapist may kill his victim to conceal his crime.
 51  In contrast, the property crimes we consider—that 
consist of burglary, larceny, and auto theft—do not involve contact between perpetrators and 
victims, and should not be affected by the harshness of punishment for murder.   
  Because the ban on the death penalty and its subsequent reinstatement might also reflect 
changing judicial attitudes toward crime, we do expect some comovements between various kinds 
of crimes.  Thus, the proper metric for this robustness check must be the extent of dissimilarity, 
rather than similarity, of the moratorium’s effects on various crimes.  We conduct before-and-after 
comparisons and estimate regressions using both national and state-level data for 1960-2000. 
  The before-and-after comparisons for property crime rates using national data reveal that the 
direction of the property crime changes varies over the three horizons.  The two- and three-year 
averages show an increase in property crime after 1972 (9.9% and 20.4%) as well as after 1976 
                                                 
51 Another reason we examine property crimes is because many violent crimes were punishable by death in the 
1960s. 
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that for murder.  The one-year comparisons show no change after the introduction of the 
moratorium and a 4.3% drop after its lifting.  In sum, the moratorium seems to have different 
effects on property crimes than it has on murders. 
  Before-and-after comparisons using state-level data yield similar results.  The introduction of 
the moratorium in 1972 seems to coincide with an increase in property crimes that is similar to 
murder, especially in the two-year and three-year averages.  However, contrary to murders, 
property crimes increase after the lifting of the moratorium.  In fact, 77 percent of the states that 
reinstated the death penalty experienced an increase in their three-year average property crime 
rates.  The opposite movements in murders and property crimes after the moratorium suggest that 
the deterrent finding is not the result of general trends in crime.  The regression results that follow 
provide further support for this argument. 
  Using national data, the regressions of property crime both on execution and on lagged 
execution produce coefficient estimates that are statistically insignificant, with p-values of .304 and 
.122, respectively.  A similar result is found for the binary moratorium period also produced a highly 
insignificant coefficient estimate with a p-value of .611.  These estimates suggest that property crime 
during the moratorium period was not higher than its mean for the rest of the sample. 
  We find similar results in the state-level panel regressions.  We estimate all seven primary 
regressions from Table 7 with property crime as the dependent variable.  Table 8 reports the results 
of these regressions.  The insignificant coefficients on execution, lagged execution, and the 
moratorium dummy variable in all seven regressions indicate that the death penalty has no 
predictable effect on property crimes.  As expected, crimes that are not punishable by death are 
unaffected by changes in death penalty statutes or the frequency of executions.   
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murder.  Although the coefficients on the income variable are mostly insignificant, the 
unemployment rate has a significant, positive effect on property crime.  Other studies have found a 
similar positive relationship between unemployment and property crimes.
52  The minority 
population also has a different relationship with property crime.
53  Consistent with other studies, 
the percent of the population that belongs to a minority group is negatively related to the property 
crime rate.
54 The age and police employment variables have similar effects on murders and 
property crime.  The percentage of the population that is age 15-19 has a significant, negative 
effect on property crime and the percentage of the population that is age 20-24 has a significant, 
positive effect on property crime.  The coefficients on police employment remain insignificant. 
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
  This paper provides strong evidence for the deterrent effect of capital punishment by 
analyzing the moratorium on executions as a controlled “judicial experiment.”  Our results are 
especially pertinent now because several states have imposed new moratoriums or are considering 
doing so.  For example, the Governors of Illinois and Maryland suspended executions in 2000 and 
2002, respectively, although Maryland resumed death penalty sentences in 2003.  In 2003, the 
North Carolina senate passed legislation imposing a two-year moratorium while state officials 
conduct a thorough examination of the state’s death penalty system.  However, the legislation 
failed to pass the house.  Moreover, moratorium bills have recently been introduced in 
                                                 
52 Gould, Mustard, & Weinberg, supra note 39. 
53 Other studies have also found violent and property crimes to be affected differently by various control variables; 
see, e.g., John Lott & David Mustard, Crime, Deterrence and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 Journal of 
Legal Studies 1 (1997) and Dennis Byrne, Hashem Dezhbakhsh, and Randall King, Unionism and Police 
Productivity: An Econometric Investigation, 35 Industrial Relations 566 (1996). 
54 Shepherd, supra note 46; Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Criminals Like Us?: Risk Attitudes, Sentencing Guidelines, 
and Increased Crime, Clemson University Working Paper (2003). 
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  Most previous capital punishment studies have restricted their focus to regression specifics, 
such as functional form and relevant variables.  Using similar and often identical data, the studies 
have produced contrasting results using different specifications.  In contrast, we approach the 
deterrence question from a new angle: we exploit the “judicial experiment” generated by the 
Supreme Court’s effective moratorium on the death penalty between 1972 and 1976, while also 
drawing on substantial pre- and postmoratorium evidence.  We perform before-and-after-
moratorium comparisons and regressions using both national time-series data and state-level panel 
data for 1960-2000.  The results are boldly clear: executions deter murders and murder rates 
increase substantially during moratoriums.  The results are consistent across before-and-after 
comparisons and regressions regardless of the data’s aggregation level, the time period, or the 
specific variable used to measure executions. 
  We also confirm that our results hold up to changes in our choice of regressors, estimation 
method, and functional form.  The deterrent variables’ coefficients are remarkably consistent in sign 
and significance across 84 different regression models.  In addition, we verify that the negative 
relationship between the death penalty and murder is not a spurious finding.  Before-and-after 
moratorium comparisons and regressions reveal that the death penalty does not cause a decrease in 
property crimes, suggesting that the deterrent effect is not reflecting general trends in crime. 
  This convincing evidence for the deterrent effect does not necessarily indicate that capital 
punishment is sound policy.  Although executions provide a large benefit to society by deterring 
murders, they also have costs; these include the harm from the death penalty’s possibly 
discriminatory application and the risk of executing innocent people.  Policymakers must weigh the 
benefits and costs to determine the optimal use of the death penalty.   
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Table 1: Executions and Death Penalty Laws, 1960-2000 
(States Currently Without the Death Penalty) 
 
 
  States 
No. of  Executions
(1960−1972) 
  Last Execution  State Abolished 













   Plus 
District of Columbia 
       0 
       0 
       3 
       0 
       0 
       0 
       0 
       0 
       0 
       0 
       0 
       0 
 















       1957 
       1957 
       1965 
       1887 
       1984 
       1846 
       1911 
       1973 
       1984 
       1965 
       1965 
       1853 
 
       1972 
Notes: On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court Effectively suspended the death penalty. 
The moratorium ended in July 1976 and the first postmoratorium execution took place 
in January 1977.  Rhode Island reenacted its death penalty statute in 1977 and 
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Table 2: Executions and Death Penalty Laws, 1960-2000 
                  (States Currently With the Death Penalty) 
 
     Before Furman v. Georgia 
            (1960-June 1972) 
  Since Furman v. Georgia 
        (July 1972-2000) 
 
  States 



















































     5 
     4 
     9 
   30 
     6 
     1 
     0 
   12 
   14 
     0 
     2 
     0 
     6 
     1 
     1 
     1 
   10 
     4 
     0 
     0 
     1 
     0 
     3 
     1 
   10 
     1 
     7 
     6 
     1 
     3 
     8 
     0 
     1 
   29 
     1 
     6 
     2 
     1 
   1965 
   1963 
   1964 
   1967 
   1967 
   1960 
   ----- 
   1964 
   1964 
   ----- 
   1962 
   ----- 
   1965 
   1962 
   1961 
   1961 
   1964 
   1965 
   ----- 
   ----- 
   1961 
   ----- 
   1963 
   1960 
   1962 
   1961 
   1963 
   1966 
   1962 
   1962 
   1962 
   ----- 
   1960 
   1964 
   1960 
   1962 
   1963 
   1965 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
 ---------------- 
Abolished 1972 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
Restored 1961 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 




  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
Abolished 1964 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
  ---------------- 
----------------- 
   23 
   22 
   23 
     8 
     1 
     0 
   11 
   50 
   23 
     1 
   12 
     7 
     0 
     2 
   26 
     3 
     4 
   46 
     2 
     3 
     8 
     0 
     0 
     0 
     0 
   16 
     1 
   30 
     2 
     3 
   25 
     0 
     1 
  239 
     6 
   81 
     3 
     1 
   1983 
   1992 
   1990 
   1992 
   1997 
   ----- 
   1992 
   1979 
   1983 
   1994 
   1990 
   1981 
   ----- 
   1997 
   1983 
   1994 
   1983 
   1989 
   1995 
   1994 
   1979 
   ----- 
   ----- 
   ----- 
   ----- 
   1984 
   1999 
   1990 
   1996 
   1995 
   1985 
   ----- 
   2000 
   1982 
   1977 
   1982 
   1993 
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  26 
  32 
  38 
    7 
    1 
  11 
  62 
  37 
    1 
  14 
    7 
    6 
    3 
  27 
    4 
  14 
  50 
    2 
    3 
    9 
    0 
    3 
    1 
  10 
  17 
    8 
  36 
    3 
    6 
  33 
    0 
    2 
 268 
    7 
  87 
    5 
    2 
Notes: On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court effectively suspended the death penalty (Furman v. Georgia).   
Some states reenacted their capital statutes soon after Furman, but the death penalty was officially 
reinstated with the Supreme Court’s decision on July 2, 1976 (Gregg vs. Georgia).  
   * The abolition of the death penalty in New Mexico and New York was restrictive as it did not cover 
killing an on duty police officer or a prison guard by inmates. 
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   Entire Period (1960-2000) 
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  9.397 
(44.92***)
 
Notes:  The dependent variable in all equations is the murder rate.  T-statistics are in parenthesis.  ‘**” and 
‘***’ indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The Supreme Court’s effective 
moratorium on the death penalty ended in 1976 and the first postmoratorium execution took place in 
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                   Sampling Period (1960-2000) 
 





 Executions Lagged 
 
 






Per Capita Real Income 
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0.77 0.79 0.78  0.80 
Notes:  The dependent variable in all equations is the murder rate.  T-statistics are in 
parenthesis.  ‘*’, ‘**” and ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
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Table 5-  Percentage Change in Murder Rates Before and After 









   Two Year 
   Averages 
Comparison of
   Three Year 
    Averages 
 
No. of Observations 
 






Sample Standard Error 
 
T-statistic 
(p-value for the T-test) 
 
 
     45 
 
     33 
 
    8.33 
 
   10.05 
 
    2.811 
 
   3.57*** 
   (0.0004) 
 
 
     45 
 
     39 
 
   14.89 
 
   16.25 
 
    2.213 
 
   7.34*** 
   (0.0000) 
 
 
     45 
 
     41 
 
   18.37 
 
   21.86 
 
    2.480 
 
   8.81*** 
   (0.0000) 
 
Notes: T-statistics test the hypothesis of no change against the alternative of more 
murders.  ‘**” and ‘***’ indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
For the one-year comparison, murder rates in the year before and after the change are 
compared.  For two-year (three-year) comparisons, the average crime rate two years 
(three years) before and the average crime rate two years (three years) after the legal 
change are compared.  All changes are in percents.  Two outlier observations are 
excluded from one-year comparisons, one from two-year comparisons, and one from 
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Table 6-  Percentage Change in Murder Rates Before and After 









   Two Year 
   Averages 
Comparison of
   Three Year 
    Averages 
 
No. of Observations 
 






Sample Standard Error 
 
T-statistic 
(p-value for the T-test) 
 
 
     41 
 
     29 
 
   −9.30 
 
   −6.33 
 
    3.381 
 
  −1.87** 
   (0.034) 
 
 
     39 
 
     23 
 
   −6.82 
 
   −6.39 
 
    2.928 
 
  −2.18** 
   (0.017) 
 
 
     39 
 
     26 
 
   −7.50 
 
   −4.07 
 
    2.921 
 
  −1.39* 
   (0.085) 
 
Notes: T-statistics test the hypothesis of no change against the alternative of fewer 
murders.  ‘**” and ‘***’ indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
For the one-year comparison, murder rates in the year before and after the change are 
compared.  For two-year (three-year) comparisons, the average crime rate two years 
(three years) before and the average crime rate two years (three years) after the legal 








                          Coefficients Estimates for Various Models 
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  0.0001 
  (0.63) 
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  (1.06) 
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  0.0000 
  (0.40) 
 






























  (−0.08) 
 






























  (−0.02) 
 














  0.817    0.817    0.807    0.820    0.822    0.822    0.825 
Notes:  The dependent variable in all equations is the murder rate.  T-statistics are in parenthesis.  ‘*’, ‘**” and 
‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Estimates for the state specific 
fixed effects and time trend variables are not reported.  
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       Table 8: Property Crime Rate Regression Results; 




                          Coefficients Estimates for Various Models 
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  0.109 
















































































































  0.835    0.832    0.836    0.832    0.836    0.833    0.833 
Notes:  The dependent variable in all equations is the property crime rate.  T-statistics are in parenthesis.  ‘*’, 
‘**” and ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Estimates for the state 























































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
year
Murder Rate  Number of Executions
Figure 1-  U.S. Murder Rate and Executions
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressFigure 2-  Distribution of the Percentage Change in Murder Rates Before 
 and After Suspending (or Abolishing) the Death Penalty 





Notes: The probability densities for the murder rate changes are estimated using 
Biweight Kernel with optimal bandwidth.  A positive value indicates an 
increase in the state’s murder rate after the death penalty is suspended 
(abolished). For the one-year comparison, murder rates immediately before 
and after the change are compared.  For two-year (three-year) comparisons, 
the average crime rate two years (three years) before and the average crime 
rate two years (three years) after the legal change are compared.  All changes 
are in percents.  Two outlier observations are excluded from one-year 
comparisons, one from two-year comparisons, and one from three-year 
comparisons.  All four observations are positive and larger than 200.    
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 and After Reinstating the Death Penalty 





Notes: The probability densities for the murder rate changes are estimated using 
Biweight Kernel with optimal bandwidth.  A negative value indicates a drop 
in the state’s  murder rate after the death penalty is reinstated.  For the one-
year comparison, murder rates right before and after the change are compared.  
For two-year (three-year) comparisons, the average crime rate two years 
(three years) before and the average crime rate two years (three years) after 
the legal change are compared.  All changes are in percents. 
  7
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressFigure 4-  Cross-Model Distributions of the Coefficient Estimates 
 for the Deterrent Variables.   





Notes: The probability densities for the deterrent coefficient estimates 







National data:  Crime rates are defined as the number of crimes per 100,000 population.  
Property crime rates and the murder & nonnegligent manslaughter rates (the willful killing of 
one human being by another) are obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ web site at  
http://149.101.22.40/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/statebystatelist.cfm.    
 
State data:  State-level crime rates for 1960-2000 are available from the FBI's Uniform Crime 
Reports.  These data can be accessed on-line at: 
http://149.101.22.40/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm.  The  New York murder 
rates for 1960 through 1964 are missing from this data set, so we extracted the missing data 
from the Vital Statistics of the United States (1960-1964) published by the National Center 
for Health Statistics.  The New York property crime rates for 1960-1964 are also missing 
from this data set and were unavailable; they were linearly extrapolated using the linear trend 
in the following five data points (for auto theft a two year window was used to avoid a 
negative estimate). 
 
Death Penalty Statutes 
 
The data on changes in Death Penalty Statutes of various states (reported in tables 1 and 2) 
have been extracted from Bowers (1974), Tables 1-1 and 2-1 and the Death Penalty 









Per capita income data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/.  The nominal data were changed into real using 
consumer price index series (with 1983/1984 as the base year) obtained from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu.  
 
Police Expenditure and Employment 
 
National data: The data on state and local expenditures on police protection (aggregated over 
all states) are from the series Uniform Crime Reports for the U.S. (1960-1992), and Crime in 
the United States (1993-2000).  Few observations were missing and were linearly 
interpolated. 
State data: Data on full-time state police employees are from the Uniform Crime Reports for 
the United States (1960-1992) and Crime in the United States (1993-2000) both published by 
the U.S. Department of Justice.  Some of the states did not collect state-level police 
employment for the years 1960-1964.  For these states, we obtained estimates of the missing 
data using linear extrapolated of the growth trends in police employment for the following 
five years.  A couple of states also had one or two missing years of data later in the sample 
  9
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressperiod; we linearly interpolated this data as well.  Washington, D.C. and Hawaii did not report 
state-level police employment data. 
 
Population and Other Demographic Variables 
 
National Data:  Population data (midyear population estimates of the Bureau of the Census) 
are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/. 
 
State Data:  These data were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the 
Bureau of the Census (Historical Census Statistics), and Geolytics Collection (Complied in 





Unemployment rate series were collected from the Manpower Report of the President (1960-




The data on voting in presidential elections is from The Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections 
by Dave Leip.  The data is available online at: http://www.uselectionatlas.org/.  
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